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During 2009, pandemic infl uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus affected humans on Réunion Island. Since then, the 
virus has sustained circulation among local swine herds, 
raising concerns about the potential for genetic evolution 
of the virus and possible retransmission back to humans of 
variants with increased virulence. Continuous surveillance 
of A(H1N1)pdm09 infection in pigs is recommended.
Infl uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, which caused the last infl uenza pandemic among humans, is a unique 
reassortant derived from swine infl uenza viruses of the 
triple reassortant swine North American lineage and the 
avian-like swine Eurasian lineage (1). Réunion Island, a 
tropical French overseas department in the southwestern 
Indian Ocean, was struck by the infl uenza pandemic during 
July–August 2009. The epidemic had a high attack rate in 
humans (estimated clinically at 12.5% and serologically at 
40.0%) (2,3). A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was reported to cause a 
reverse zoonosis in pigs (4); thus, a long-term (2009–2011) 
serologic and virologic survey was designed to check for 
transmission of the virus to pigs on Réunion Island, where 
the pork industry is a key economic activity and no live 
pigs have been imported since 1978. At 6-month intervals, 
a local veterinary surveillance system conducts serologic 
surveillance for pathogenic swine infl uenza viruses (H1N1, 
H1N2, and H3N2) among local herds, and during the last 
20 years, none have been detected. 
The Study
During a fi rst step (November 2009–February 2010), 
seroprevalence rates for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus were 
assessed in 120 breeding pigs (>4 years old) from 57 farms. 
Blood was obtained from randomly selected pigs at the only 
slaughterhouse on the island, where pigs are held for <3 
hours. We screened the samples for antibodies to infl uenza 
A viruses by using the ID Screen Antibody Infl uenza A kit 
(ID.vet, Montpellier, France), and titers were determined 
by using hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) assays (5) 
against all classical swine infl uenza viruses and A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus (Table 1). Ninety-eight (81.7%; 95% CI 
74.7%–88.5%) of the 120 serum samples were positive for 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (HI titers >20); the range of positive 
titers was 40–640, and 54.2% of the samples expressed high 
HI titers (160–640). Of the 98 serum samples, 5 reacted at 
low titer and with only 1 European A (H1N1) swine virus 
(titer <20), i.e., >4 dilutions lower than for A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus, indicating cross reactivity (6). Thus, pigs from 47 
(82.4%) of 57 tested farms had been infected by A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus; the seroprevalence rate was 81%–100% for 
pigs on 79.0% of the farms. Farms with affected pigs were 
located throughout the island (Figure).
In a second step (June 2010, when A(H1N1)pdm09 
infection was no longer detected among humans), we tested 
whether the virus was still circulating among pigs born that 
year. To obtain nasal swab and blood samples for testing, 
we randomly selected 390 fattening pigs (25–27 weeks old) 
at the slaughterhouse; the pigs originated from 45 farms. At 
the time of sampling, the veterinary surveillance system did 
not report any clinical signs suggesting virus circulation 
among herds. However, ≈3.5% of the serum samples (9% 
of tested farms) contained antibodies to A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus (HI titers 20–160). Nasal swab specimens from 
6.7% (26/390) of pigs were positive for A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus as determined by using a specifi c real-time reverse 
transcription PCR (rRT-PCR); the pigs originated from 13 
(28.8%) farms (7). Two strains, A/Sw/La Reunion/0164/10 
and A/Sw/LaReunion/110348/10, were isolated onto 
MDCK cell cultures (5).
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During July–December 2010, 11 farms reported 
infl uenza-like clinical signs in pigs, and proof of A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus infection was established on 3 farms (farms 
A–C). In June 2010, fattening pigs on farm A were 
seronegative for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. In July, when 
acute respiratory disease was reported among pigs, 12 of 
39 fattening pigs (18–21 weeks old) sampled on farm A 
were still seronegative for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus; however, 
rRT-PCR results were positive for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. 
Four weeks later, when pigs had recovered from infl uenza, 
only 7.7% (3/39) of sampled pigs on farm A had rRT-
PCR results positive for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, and all 
39 were seropositive for the virus. High rates of rRT-PCR 
positivity were also noted for pigs on farms B (17/30 pigs) 
and C (6/15 pigs). Two A(H1N1)pdm09 strains (A/Sw/
LaReunion/0167/10 and A/Sw/La Reunion/110194/10) 
were isolated from pigs on farms A and B, respectively.
Four infl uenza virus strains were isolated from 
pigs, and all induced a cytopathic effect and displayed 
hemagglutinating activity on chicken erythrocytes; all 4 
were confi rmed as A(H1N1)pdm09 virus by specifi c rRT-
PCRs. In addition cross-HI assays (5) revealed that these 
strains exhibit antigenic relationships with swine infl uenza 
A(H1N1) viruses from classical and avian-like lineages, 
although they reacted most strongly with A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus (Table 1). Genome sequencing of these strains 
showed high (>98%) nucleotide sequence homology to 
the corresponding genes of A/California/04/09 and 2009 
human strains from Réunion Island, suggesting human-to-
swine transmission (H. Pascalis, unpub. data).
In a third step (March, July–August, and October 
2011), 3 other sampling campaigns were conducted at 
the slaughterhouse, including 831 fattening pigs from 
104 farms. Nasal swab samples for 7 (8.4%) pigs from 3 
(2.9%) farms still had rRT-PCR–positive results. However, 
serologic analyses revealed that pigs on ≈40% of the farms 
(distributed throughout the island) were seropositive for 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, indicating continuing circulation of 
the virus in swine herds (Table 2).
Conclusions
Consistent with fi ndings elsewhere (8), our results 
show that A(H1N1)pdm09 virus has substantially affected 
swine herds in Réunion Island. Results of our long-term 
(≈2 years) investigation show that A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 
has circulated in pigs beyond the 5-week epidemic among 
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Table 1. Antigenic characterization of A(H1N1)pdm09-like influenza viruses isolated from pigs, Réunion Island, 2010* 
Virus strain 
HI titers† obtained with reference swine hyperimmune serum samples directed against 
California/04/09‡  
Sw/England/ 
117316/86§ 
Sw/Cotes 
d'Armor/0388/09¶ Sw/Flandres/1/98#  
Sw/Scotland/ 
410440/94** 
A/Sw/La Reunion/0164/10 1,280 160 40 <10 <10 
A/Sw/La Reunion/110348/10 1,280 80 160 10 20 
A/Sw/La Reunion/0167/10 640 80 40 <10 <10 
A/Sw/La Reunion/110194/10 640 80 20 <10 10 
*HI, hemagglutination inhibition. 
†HI tests were performed according to standard procedure (5).Titers are expressed as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of serum that inhibits 4 
hemagglutination units of virus. 
‡A(H1N1)pdm09 lineage. 
§Classical swine A(H1N1). 
¶Avian-like swine A(H1N1). 
#Human-like reassortant swine A(H3N2). 
**Human-like reassortant swine A(H1N2). 
Figure. Location of farms tested for antibodies against infl uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in serologic surveys, Réunion Island, 2009–2011. 
Black dots, seronegative farms; gray dots, seropositive farms.
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humans during the austral winter 2009 (3) and has become 
a novel enzootic pathogen in Réunion Island.
Several facts may account for the heavy human-to-
swine transmission of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. First, the 
reassortant pandemic virus contains genomic segments 
originating from swine infl uenza viruses established in pigs 
(1). Second, pigs are highly susceptible to experimental 
inoculations with A(H1N1)pdm09 virus and support 
high intraspecies transmissibility (9). Third, the pressure 
of infection caused by A(H1N1)pdm09 virus among 
humans in Réunion Island was high but most infections 
were mild or asymptomatic (3); therefore, people pursued 
their professional activities, acting as silent spreaders of 
the virus. Last, pigs on Réunion Island had no history of 
previous passages of swine infl uenza viruses; thus, the lack 
of specifi c immunity to infl uenza A viruses would have 
contributed to the high sensitivity of the pigs to infection, 
as described (10,11).
Despite serologic proof of large numbers of infected 
pigs during late 2009–early 2010 in Réunion Island, 
infl uenza-like signs were not exhibited and reported until 
July 2010; this fi nding was similar to that in New Caledonia 
(8). In July 2010, several herds showed symptomatic 
changes in infection that could indicate either a change in 
virulence of the circulating strain or the intervention of co-
infecting pathogens or some other environmental factor(s). 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and Pasteurella multocida 
were co-detected on farms with pigs with signs of infection 
(data not shown). Co-infection with swine infl uenza 
virus and these bacteria is known to contribute to severe 
respiratory disorders among pigs; thus, these bacteria may 
have enhanced pathogenicity of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus on 
affected farms (12).
Because specifi c immunity to A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus will decline over time when the virus is no longer 
circulating among humans, persistence of the virus in an 
animal reservoir raises concerns about the risk for genetic 
evolution of the virus and retransmission back to humans of 
variants with potentially increased virulence. As an example, 
during the 2011 austral winter, only infl uenza A(H3N2) 
and B viruses were recorded (13). Novel reassortant viruses 
containing genomic segments from A(H1N1)pdm09 and 
enzootic swine infl uenza viruses have been isolated in pigs 
(14). Such a reassortant was responsible for several cases 
of infl uenza among humans in 2011 (15); these cases were 
mild, but other, more virulent pathogenic viruses could 
emerge. Hence continuous surveillance of A(H1N1)pdm09 
infection in pigs is recommended.
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